Wright State University

CORE Scholar
Economics Student Publications

Economics

1990

The Effects of Political Instability on Economic
Growth: A Case for Sub-Saharan Africa
Gregory Wayne Willis
Wright State University - Main Campus

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/econ_student
Part of the Business Commons, and the Economics Commons
Repository Citation
Willis, G. W. (1990). The Effects of Political Instability on Economic Growth: A Case for Sub-Saharan Africa. .
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/econ_student/82

This Master's Culminating Experience is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Student Publications by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact
corescholar@www.libraries.wright.edu, library-corescholar@wright.edu.

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:
A CASE FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

An internship report submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
By
Gregory Wayne Willis
B.A.,Wright State University, 1988

1990
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
December 31, 1990
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS INTERNSHIP REPORT PREPARED UNDER
MY SUPERVISION BY GREGORY WAYNE WTLLTS ENTITLED THE EFFECTS OF
POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CASE FOR SIJB-SAHAR AN
AFRICA BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE .

and Applied Economic
program

ABSTRACT
Willis, Gregory Wayne. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State
University, 1990. The Effects of Political Instability on Economic
Growth: A Case for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced both poor
economic performance and substantial political instability since their
independence. There have been numerous studies investigating the
possible relationship between political instability and economic
growth. The common approach to investigating this relationship is to
measure the effect of economic growth on the probability of political
instability. This paper takes the opposite approach by investigating
the effects of political instability on economic growth. We believe
that political instability disrupts the economic system causing a
reduction in growth. We measure this effect using regression
analysis to estimate two models we have developed. The first model
is a single equation model where we have expanded a neoclassical
growth model to include a measure of political instability. The
second model is a simultaneous model where in addition to the single
equation above, we have added a second equation to estimate an
investment variable used in the first equation. We found the
estimated coefficients for political instability in both models are
negative with the political instability coefficient for the simultaneous
model some 18.7 percent larger than for the single equation OLS
model. Given whatever model is used, the results that we have
found supports the theory that political instability reduces economic
growth. Therefore, any policy action taken by decision makers in
Sub-Saharan Africa concerning economic growth, would have to
address the problem of political instability.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that individuals are separated by those
who have and those who do not. Like individuals, countries are also
divided according to their relative wealth. On one end of the
spectrum are the industrialized countries who possess great wealth
and income, and often engage in conspicuous consumption. On the
other end of the spectrum exist the poor nations of the Third World,
where incomes are so low, consumption is often only for subsistence.
These wealthier countries have been referred to as the developed
countries, whereas the poorer countries have been labelled the lessdeveloped countries (LDCs).
There have been numerous studies to determine why some
countries develop and others do not. The results of these studies
often find as many reasons as there are studies. However, there
have been some generally accepted conclusions made from these
studies, but no all encompassing theory for explaining differences in
levels of development among nations has come forth.
Different schools of thought have stressed different factors in
explaining the differences in growth across countries. Neoclassical
economists stress the importances of factors of production such as
labor and capital, assuming that the institutional framework within
which the factors of production work exists. Institutional economists
on the other hand stress the importance of the availability of
efficient and stable economic, social, and political institutions without
which factors of production cannot do any good. Indeed Reynolds

(1983) argues that political stability is the single most important
factor that explains differences in the long term economic growth
among nations.
The dependency school attributes lack of
development in LDCs to the unequal relationships between LDCs and
developed countries (DCs).
Though there seems to be contradiction among the various
schools of thought, it is easy to reconcile the apparent contradictions.
Each school of thought seem to emphasize one aspect of factors that
influence economic development. It is clear that without the proper
institutional structures that set up the parameters within which
exchange, production, and consumption takes place, there can be no
long term development.
Dependency theories stress how
international linkages distort institutions in LDCs, thus making it
harder for them to achieve long term economic growth. Any
reasonable model of economic growth should therefore include both
the institutional and "technological " aspects: This paper will attempt
to do that.
The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of political
instability on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is our belief
that political instability creates a sense of short-term uncertainty.
This uncertainty causes a destabilizing effect in the functions and
actions of institutions and economic agents within an economic
system. It does this by creating additional risk and breaking down
the cohessiveness of workers. The addition of risk and the
breakdown of unity disrupts the normal economic process, thus
2

causing a decline in economic growth. A look into Sub-Saharan
Africa's past economic performance and political instability would
seem to suggest that a possible relationship exist between the two.
SUB-SAHARAN
PERFORMANCE

It seems that in Sub-Saharan Africa no matter what measure of
development one uses, the result is underdevelopment. Sub-Saharan
Africa had great hopes for growth and development after gaining
independence from colonial powers in the 1960s. These hopes still
remain only hopes. Morawetz reported that growth in LDCs between
1950-75 was greater than in the DCs for the same period. Thus, the
gap between developed and developing countries had narrowed.
Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa did not share in this growth; the
gap between DCs and Sub-Saharan Africa widened over the period.
Some basic indicators of development have shown Sub-Saharan
Africa to be among the poorest of all LDCs (see Table 1). Average
annual growth rate of GNP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa was
only .6 percent for the period 1965-87. This was the lowest growth
rate of all LDC groupings. The LDC region with the next lowest GNP
per capita growth rate was South Asia, which had a substantially
higher rate of 1.8%. East Asia lead all LDC groupings with a 5.1%
growth rate for the period.
GNP per capita in 1987 dollars showed Sub-Saharan Africa to
have the second lowest of the groupings. South Asia's $290 just beat
out Sub-Saharan Africa's $330 for that honor. The highest GNP per

capita values reported were those for the Europe, Middle East and
North Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean.
Another important measure of "development" stressed has been
a country's life expectancy. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest life
expectancy of all LDC groupings. Life expectancy in Sub-Saharan
Africa was only 51 years of age in 1987. The next lowest life
expectancy in LDCs was 57 years of age for South Asia. The highest
life expectancy of the LDC groupings is in East Asia, where a person is
expected to live until 68.
The growth rate of investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has been
up and down since the 1960s. From 1960-65 investment growth
was 7.9 percent, about average for the LDC groups. The greatest
growth in investment for this period occured in South Asia. This
group of countries achieved a growth rate of 11.1 percent for the
period. From 1965-1980 investment in Sub-Saharan Africa showed
some improvement from the previous period. Sub-Saharan Africa in
this period had the second highest growth rate of all LDC groupings.
Only East Asia’s growth rate of 11.3 percent was greater than SubSaharan Africa's 9.3 percent.
After improving investment in Sub-Saharan Africa between
1965-80, things turned sour. During the period from 1980-87 the
growth rate of investment was a negative 8.3 percent. Though all
LDC groups, except East Asia, experienced a decline in the growth of
investment from the previous period, Sub-Saharan Africa's decline
was the most dramatic.
4

The need for improvements in agriculture has also been
suggested as necessary for LDCs to achieve economic growth.
Agriculture productivity in LDCs is low and food output is often for
personal consumption only. Improvement in agriculture is assumed
to imply not only increases in output, but also increases in income of
farm households. Many economist point to the need for the
agriculture output to increase to support the developing
manufacturing sector. Increased output would not only be used to
feed the manufacturing sector, but also provide increased income to
allow farmers to buy newly manufactured goods. Even if agriculture
is not used to support the manufacturing sector, it is still important
to feed the population so as not to run up large deficits in trade due
to importing food.
There has been debate among economists who have suggested
the need of producing export crops and those who suggest food crops
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those who favor export crop production
believe that not only will income from these crops pay for the
imports of food but will produce enough surplus of funds to be used
in purchasing other needed goods and services. Those who support
the production of food crops raise the question of the risk involved in
export production. Since Sub-Saharan African countries are so
dependent on world economic conditions, any recession would likely
affect exports, hence income. In times of recessions, these countries
would be unable to feed themselves. Even though the export crops
5

may have returns far greater than those of food crops, the risk of
starvations is too great.
Agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and
1965 was neither high nor low compared with those of other LDC
groupings. Agriculture grew at a rate of 2.3 percent, not as high as
East Asia’s 4.6 percent yet not as low as South Asia's LI percent
growth. From 1965-80 Sub-Saharan Africa's growth in agriculture
was the worst of all LDC groups. The growth rate fell to 1.7 percent.
In the 1980-87 period, growth of agricultural output fell even
farther in Sub-Saharan Africa. Growth in this period was only 1.2
percent compared with the exceptional growth rate of 5.9 percent
that East Asia experienced.
Export growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been for the most part
average when compared with other LDCs. From 1960-65 exports
grew at a rate of 5.9 percent. In the period from 1965-80, SubSaharan Africa's exports grew even higher at a rate of 6.6 percent.
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a substantial decline in the
growth rate of exports in the period from 1980-87. The growth rate
of exports was a negative 1 percent. All other LDC groups
experienced an increase in their growth of exports for this period.
If the educating of the population is considered a sign of
development, Sub-Saharan Africa is severly lacking. Education levels
in Sub-Saharan Africa have improved since 1965, but are still much
lower than other developing regions. The total percentage of the
school age population in Sub-Saharan Africa enrolled in primary
6

school in 1965 was 41percent. Sub-Saharan Africa increased their
enrollment figure to 66 percent in 1987.
Secondary enrollment in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from only 4
percent in 1965 to 16 percent in 1986. Yes, this is a 400 percent
increase, but it shouldbe kept in mindthat only 16 percent of the
population in enrolled in secondary schools. Sub-Saharan Africa's 16
percent enrollment rate is only half the next lowest LDC groups'
enrollment rate.
The main thrust of education in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be
to provide primary education. Education participation rate after
primary schooling drops dramatically. Providing secondary and
post-secondary education to the masses may seem to be inefficient
to LDCs because many of the jobs in their countries involve low skill
levels. Their manufacturing involves labor intensive technologies in
which a primary education is probably enough to perform these
tasks.
Because it may not be efficient to provide post-secondary
education to a few students, many countries subsidizes students who
travel to DC universities to get their education. Of course in some
instances there has been cases of "BRAIN DRAIN". Foreign students
often find life in DCs to be very appealing.

7

TABLE 1
PAST ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
STATISTICS

Sub-Saharan South Asia
Africa

East Asia Middle East,
N. Africa &

S. Europe

Latin
America

Avg. growth
rate GNP per
capita 1965-87
.6
1.8
5.1
2.5
GNP per capita
1987 dollars
330
290
470
1940
Life expectancy
in 1987
51
57
68
64
Growth of gross
domestic invest
ment:
1960-65
11.1
7.9
8.6
-3.1*
1965-80
9.3
4.6
11.3
9.0
1980-87
-8.3
3.7
12.1
Growth of
agriculture:
1960-65
2.3
1.1
4.6
1.6*
1965-80
1.7
2.7
3.3
3.5
1.2
1.4
1980-87
5.9
Growth of
exports:
1960-65
5.9
4.6
7.2
1.3
1965-80
6.6
1.7
9.7
1980-87
-1.0
4.8
10.1
Education
% enrolled:
Primary:
41
1965
68
88
83
84
1987
66
123
97
Secondary:
4
29
32
1965
23
32
1987
16
45
56
* represents where Southern Europe was not used in calculating these
All data for this table was compiled using World Bank staistics.
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2.1
1790
66

4.5
8.3
-4.5
3.6
3.2
2.2
6.1
-2.1
3.0

98
108
19
48
figures

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Political instability seems to be common among Sub-Saharan
Africa. Mbaku (1988) has stated that there have been 56 coups
between 1 Jan. 1956 and 30 April 1984. As of 1984, only six
countries had not experienced coups, attempted coups, or plots. They
were Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, and
Swaziland. The question why is political instability so widespread in
Sub-Saharan Africa may be found in why these six countries have
had none. McGowen and Johnson (1984) have offered a possible
explanation of why these six countries are free of elite instability.
The reason given for Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland not having
instability was its relationship with South Africa. South Africa is
thought to be a protector of the present regimes of these countries
for their own security. McGowen and Johnson have suggested that
the other three countries are simply too small in size,
and
insignificant in economic and political power.
Political instability is often defined as a deviation from accepted
patterns of political behavior such as a challenge to the present
political authority that is not through constitutional means. Many
authors may only include "violent" challenges to the political system,
but this would leave out "peaceful" challenges such as strikes and
demonstration which can cause political disruption.
Mbaku (1988) list three types of political instability, Elite,
Communal, and Mass. Elites are those persons who hold high
9

positions in institutions which allocate resources. Elite instability,
therefore, is the forceful removal of these persons by other members
of the elite. The type of challenge common to Elite instability
includes coups, attempted coups, and plots.
The second type of political instability is Communal. Communal
groups consists of members who share common characteristics, such
as ethnicity, religion, language, territory or combination of these
traits. Behaviors usually associated with Communal instability are
civil wars, rebellions and ethnic violence. From theseactivities it is
easily seen that most Communal instability is violent.
The final political instability category, Mass instability, involves
the attack on leaders of the present political system by members
who are joined together by common goals and objectives.
Mass
instability members differ from Communal groups by being based on
goals and objectives rather than common social traits.
Some examples of political instability that have taken place in
Africa are:
13 Jan. 1963. TOGO: Members of the army assassinate President
Sylvanus Olympio in front of the U.S Embassey, and hand over to
Nicholas Grunitzky.
24 Feb. 1966. GHANA: While President Kwame Nkrumah was out of
the country, military units led by Col. Kofoka placed retired MajorGeneral Joseph Ankrah as Head of State.
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19 Nov. 1968. MALI: The army led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore
overthrew the civilian regime of President Modibo Keita in a
bloodless coup.
13 Jan. 1972. GHANA: While Prime Minister Kofi Busia was abroad,
the military led by Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong seized power.
1 Sept. 1981. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: The army under the
leadership of General Andre Kolingba overthrew the regime of
President David Dacko.
3 Apr. 1984. GUINEA: Three days after the funeral of President
Ahmad Sekou Toure, the military led by Colonel Lansana Conte took
over the Government in a bloodless coup to prevent a power struggle
among Toure's civilian successors.
Given the poor economic performance and a high degree of
political instability that has occured in Sub-Saharan Africa in the
past, many researchers have found the relationship between the two
occurrences to be important enough to investigate a possible
relationship between the two. The studies done on the subject have
for the most part been dominated by politcal scientists. It is their
view that poor economic performance leads to political instability.
They believe poor performance of the economy causes the population
to become unhappy with decision makers. This displeasure can
cause either the population to take action or it may give other
specific groups an excuse to take action.
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The empirical results from these studies support this view.
Researchers have found that poor economic performance increases
the probability of political instability.
This study focuses on the effects of political instability on
economic growth. This is in no way an attempt to refute the results
suggesting that economic problems do have effects on political
instability, but to investigate the possibility that the causation flows
from political instability to economic stagnation. We feel that both
theories of causation can exist simultaneously. All we are saying is
that given the cause of political instability, political instability will in
turn cause a decline in economic growth.
It is perhaps the belief that the two theories refute each other
that is responsible for the lack of work done in determining the
effects of political instability on economc growth. Many researchers
may feel it is not necessary to investigate the effects of political
instability on economic growth given the findings for the reverse. It
is our hope that this study will add to the literature by investigating
the effects of political instability on economic growth.
To measure the effects of politcal instability on economic growth,
we have developed two models; one using a single equation and the
other using simultaneous equations. The single equation model is
based on a neoclassical growth model with the addition of a measure
of political instability. The simultaneous equation model uses the
same equation as above, with the addition of an equation to estimate
an investment variable in the original equation. The simultaneous
12

equation model will not only allow for measuring the direct effect of
political instability on economic growth, but the indirect effect
through investment.
To estimate our model, we will use cross-national time-series
data from a sample of 41 Sub-Saharan African states from the period
1970 to 1983.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
McGowan and Johnson (1984) investigated the relationship
between African military coups and underdevelopment in their
cross-sectional study of 39 Sub-Saharan countries. They regressed
the dependent variable total military involvement score (T.M.I.S.) on
a number of independent variables. T.M.I.S. is a simple weighted
sum of coups, attempted coups, and plots. These three activities
were measured for each country from 1 Jan. 1956 to 30 Apr. 1984.
Coups were arbitrarily given the value of 5, attempted coups
received a score of 3, and a value of 1 was assigned to plots. The
T.I.M.S. was scaled in such a way that the most serious received the
highest value and the least serious received the lowest.
When the variable T.M.I.S. was regressed on the average growth
of GNP per capita, the results were; T.M.I.S. (1956-4/84) = 9.318 2.99 (average GNP per capita growth 1960-81) with a R square of
.234. The results show that there is indeed a negative relationship
between T.M.I.S. and economic development. McGowan and Johnson
have interpreted these results as suggesting that economic growth is
the key to reducing political instability.
We are somewhat critical of McGowan and Johnson's study, in
that they failed to report any t-values for their coefficients. Without
such t-values it is impossible to determine if the economic growth
variable is statistically singificantly different from zero. McGowan
and Johnson also modeled T.M.I.S. against time ( a so called proxy for
political and economic processes) and found that time accounted for
14

47.1% of the total variation in T.I.M.S. We believe they may have
found a correlation rather than a causal relationship, since they
provide no economic or political theory suggesting the reason for
using time to proxy economic or political processes.
Mbaku (1988) investigated the relationship between elite
instability and economic development. His study was a cross
national analysis of 35 African states with elite instability being
measured for the period from 1956-1985. He modelled the
dependent variable, elite instability, against the independent
variables average change in GNP per capita (1960-81), GNP per
capita for 1981 (in U.S. dollars), percent of labor force in industry in
1980, the Physical Quality of Life Index, average annual percent
change in population 1960-81, average annual percentage change in
urban population 1970-81, natural logrithim of population 1981, and
military expenditures as a percentage of GNP 1981.
Mbaku
developed his model to examine the relationship of both economic
development and socioeconomic change to elite instability. The
socioeconomic change variables are those dealing with population
and the military expenditures as a percentage of GNP
Mbaku found that variables which reflect economic growth or
development had a negative relationship with elite instability. The
coefficients for these variables were for the most part statistically
insignificant at any reasonable level of significance. The exception
was Physical Quality of Life Index which reported a t-value of 1.58.
The variable representing industrialization had a positive
15

relationship, but was statistically insignificant with a t-value of only
1.08.
Mbaku's socioeconmic variables show a positive relationship for
both the growth of population for 1960-81 and the natural logrithm
of population 1981. But again, his t-values were too low for the
coefficients to be staistically significant. Military expenditures and
the growth in urban popluation coefficients point to a negative
relationship existing with elite instability. Their respective t-values
were 1.27 and 1.20.
In Mbaku's study, he failed to give any rationale for the
inclusion of so many variables measuring economic growth or
development. The same holds true for the use of the population
variables. We can only assume that he could not choose among the
wide selection of variables and decided to include them all. The
price he paid for doing this was multicollinearity. The cause of his
low t-values were probably due to multicollinearity among the like
variables. He did achieve a relatively high R-square (.35), but this is
not supprising considering the number of variables used.
O'Leary and Coplin (1975) have attempted to predict political
instability by showing its relationship to numerous variables. They
regressed elite and communal instability against population size,
ethnic pluralism, social mobilization, urbanization, national
integration, interest-group, size of Government, economic
performance, political party unity, and external support. O'Leary and
Coplin found poor economic performance to have an influence on
16

political instability. But they found that standardized coefficients
showed economic performance to be less important in explaining
political instability than such variables as population size, interestgroup size, ethnic pluralism, and social mobilization. The two main
problems with O'Leary and Coplin's study are the fact that they fail
to report t-values for individual coefficients and the regression
method used.
As we have seen, the common approach to economic growth and
political instability is to measure the effect of economic growth on
political instability, thus inferring that poor economic performance is
a determinant of political instability. The studies that have
investigated the effect of econominc growth on political instability
have, for the most part, reached the conclusion that poor economic
performance increases the probability of political instability (namely
coups). Studies such as those by Mcgowan and Johnson, O'Leary and
Coplin, and Mbaku have all reached the conclusion that a negative
relationship between economic growth and political instability exists,
where economic performance is a determinant to political instability.
However, ther have been few studies that reverse the direction of
causation, where political instability leads to economic stagnation.
Londregan and Poole (1990) investigated the relationship
between economic performance and political instability with the
possibility that both political instability and economic growth affects
each other. They modelled political instability with economic growth
as a determinant, and in turn modelled economic growth with
17

political instability as an independent variable. Their sample
consisted of 121 countries for the period from 1950-1982.
Londregan and Poole modelled the effect of economic growth on
political instability by using a Probit Model. The model was to
measure the effect of a set of variables on the probabilty of a Coup d'
Etat. The set of variables were comprised of recent coups (within the
last six years), past coups (beyond the last six years), log of last
period's per capita income, last periods growth rate of per capita GDP,
and dummy variables for Africa, Europe and north America, South
America, Central America and Carribean, and Oceania.
Using this model, Londregan and Poole concluded that income
variables had an inhibiting effect on coups. Specifically, last periods
log of GDP per capita had a statistically significant negative
coefficient. They found that a doubling of per capita income would
lead to a 37.4 percent reduction in the probability of a coup. These
results confirm the conclusions of other researchers that poor
economic growth increases the possibility of coups. They also found
that both measures of coups had a positive effect on the probability
of a coup, with recent coups (coups within the last 6 years) having a
stronger coup inducing effect than past coups.
Londregan and Poole used ordinary least squares regression to
estimate the effect of coup d' etat on economic performance. They
used the same sample as was used in their probit model. They also
used the same set of independent variables as the probit model, but
18

they regressed them on the dependent variable percent change in
per capita GDP.
From their model they found that recent coups had a positive
coefficient of .004, but that is was statistically insignificant with a tvalue of (.2666). Past coups reported a coefficient of -.003 which
was staistically significant with a t-value of (3.00). They could give
no reason as to why past coups effect was negative or for that matter
why it would be positive. Last period's log of per capita GDP had a
negative coefficient of -.007 and was statistically significant at a 10
percent level of significance. Last period's per capita growth rate
showed a positive relationship with this periods growth rate of per
capita GDP with a statisticallysignificant coefficient of .118.
We do not feel comfortable with Londregan and Poole's
conclusions about the effect of political instability on economic
performance due to the method that they used to arrive at these
conclusions. It is our belief that their model was mispecified,
therefore their conclusion are not accurate since they were based on
the results from the model. The first thing about the model that
should be questioned is the use of the same set of independent
variables for determining both coups and economic performance.
What is the likelihood of both coups and economic performance
having the same determining factors? Another problem we see is
the use of last period GDP per capita growth rate as a determinant
for this period's. Last periods growth rate has no economic basis for
saying anything about this period's growth rate.
19

Another problem we see in their model is the measurement of
coups. The effects that we believe they were trying to measure with
recent and past coups were the short and long-term effects. The
problem is that recent and past coups are measured in a way that
the short and long-term effects are merged. It is our opinion that
the short-term effect of coups should be measured for coups
happening at least within the past 2 years, if not the past year. Their
measurement of recent coups is for coups within the last 6 years,
while past coups are measured as coups that occurred more than six
years ago. This would seem to merge the short and long-term effects
of coups. Since the short and lon-term effects of coups may be
different, the coefficient from this variable may be biased.
Given the finding of previous studies and the fact that the effects
of political instability on economic growth has been little researched,
we have chosen to investigate whether political instability has an
effect on economic growth. We are not trying to disprove the role of
economic performance in determining the occurrance of political
instability. We are only saying that political instability, whatever its
causes, will cause poor economic performance. Even if poor economic
performance causes political instability in the first place, the political
instability will cause even poorer performance. Therefore, we feel
that finding a reverse relationship between economic growth and
political instability will not contradict previous findings.
Our study will differ from Londregan and Poole's by improving
both the growth model and the measurement of political instability.
20

The growth model will include other "inputs" instead of just past
output as determinants to economic growth. The political instability
variable will only be to measure the short-term effects on economic
growth. The effects of the political instability variable we use here
will measure the effects of political instability within the past year.
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MODEL
Since

our study focuses on the short-term effects of political

instability on economic growth, it is necessary to include a measure
of political

instability

in

an

economic

growth

equation.

The

neoclassical approach to modeling economic growth has stressed the
im portance

of

assets

entrepreneurship.

such

as

land,

labor,

cap ital,

and

These assets or factors of production have been

broken down to more specific areas of importance for economic
growth in LDCs in general and Sub-Saharan Africa specifically.
Economists
specific

have pointed to

the need for improvements

areas of investment, foreign trade,

in the

and human resource

developm ent.
A net investment in capital is considered a primary source of
economic

growth.

machinery

or

im pact

of

This

investment may

infrastructure

expanding

the

projects,

be in

both

production

items such

having

capacity

of

as

the

potential

a

country.

Considering that capital is an input to production, any addition to the
capital stock of a country through investment would increase output
if the productivity of to capital, at least, remained constant.

The

hope is that new capital will have an increased level of technology
that

will

not

only increase

the

capital

stock

but increase

the

productivity of capital, thus decreasing the capital-output ratio.
Given the role of investment as an input to production, most
economist call for an increase in investment.
it is not

It should be noted that

only the quantity of investment that matters, but
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the

appropriateness and quality of investment also matter.

There are

instances where LDCs have spent valuable resources on increasing
their capital stock only to find that new capital makes the production
process less efficient.

Energy sources in LDCs are often scarce and

expensive, thus if new capital requires large amounts of energy it
may be inefficient to use.

Also, in Sub-Saharan Africa, like many

LDCs, capital goods often go unused due to a lack of spare parts.

The

high initial cost of capital goods may be met by LDCs, but they are
often unable to pay for the high cost of spare parts that keep the
capital goods functioning.

Therefore, if new capital results in a

decrease in the return to capital, output may decrease or increase
depending on whether the addition to the capital stock offsets the
decrease in capital's productivity.
Faber and Green (1984) have suggested that investment in SubSaharan Africa should be on updating previous investments instead
of investing in new projects.

They point to the fact that new projects

have been undertaken while the existing infrastructure is decaying.
The possible reason they give for this is that it is often easier to
secure aid or loans for new projects than it is for updating old
projects.
In our model we assume that an increase in investment will
result in an increase in the capital stock.

We also assume that with

an addition to the capital stock, the productivity of capital will
remain constant or increase.

Therefore,

will result in an increase in output.
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an increase in investment

The

second factor given for economic

improvement of foreign trade.
most often stress

growth

involves

The ideas in improving foreign trade

export expansion.

Exports are thought to be linked

to a country's ability to acquire inputs for production
effeciency.

the

and production

Also, because of competition, export sector is more

efficient than the non-export sector.

This efficiency spills over to the

non-export sector as exports expands.
Export expansion policies have been pursued to obtain needed
foreign exchange.

Since most LDCs rely on capital goods produced in

DCs, it is essential for LDCs to obtain foreign exchange to import such
capital.

Foreign aid has not been enough to cover all import needs,

therefore, LDCs have implemented aggressive export growth policies
to obtain the needed foreign exchange.

Most exports in LDCs consist

of primary goods or highly labor intensive manufactured goods.

For

example, in 1987, 88 percent of exports in Sub-Saharan Africa were
compossed of primary products.
Ram (1988) has stated that export growth leads to;

(a) increases

in specialization, (b) greater economies of scale due to enlarged
market size, (c) higher capacity utilization rates, (d) more rapid
transfer of technology.
According to Gyimah-Brempong (1991), exports not only allow
for

specialization

and

scale

economies

to

take

place

through

increased market size, but also provides governments a source of
revenue from export taxes.
developm ent

p ro jects

This revenue can be used to finance

where
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p rivate

investm ent

is

unable.

Therefore,

increases

in

exports

will result

in

increases

in

the

availibility of funds for development projects such as building up
needed

infrastructure.

Given the positive role of exports on economic growth, economic
growth has been hampered by trade barriers that DCs place on LDCs.
Trade barriers have been estimated to cost LDCs between 2.5 and 9
percent of their respective GNP (Nafziger 1990).

Less-developed

countries have been looking for better trade relations and in some
instances have received favorable trade status with DCs.

But due to

the economic power that DCs exert, LDCs are at the mercy of DCs
generosity.
Another area given as important to economic growth is human
resource

development.

It

has

been

suggested

that

low

labor

productivity in LDCs is not solely due to their low capital ratio, but
due to poor health and lack of educated and skilled workers.

Poor

health care is no doubt a barrier to reaching a higher level of labor
productivity.

Many workers in LDCs lack basic health care such as a

balanced diet of nutritional food.

The old saying " An army marches

on its stomach" has merit here.

Workers, like soldiers, need proper

nutrition to function at their jobs.
importance, but health care

Not only is a worker's diet of

such as availability

of doctors

prevention of disease are important to labor productivity.

and

Workers

must stay healthy if they are to perform to their full capabilities.
Like health care, education and training in LDCs are considered
important to economic Growth.
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The educating and training of the

work force results in better productivity of workers by giving them
better

management

and

factors of production.

organization

skills

when

employing

the

Workers also need to learn new "technical"

skills that workers of DCs have if LDCs are to compete with DCs in an
international market.

Education is also thought to improve economic

growth in the future by "producing" workers who are innovative.
The problem is that many LDCs do not have the facilities or finances
to educate or train their respective populace.

Even when LDCs spend

large percentages of their Gross National Product (GNP) on education,
it should be kept in mind that this may not be enough to educate and
train the work force properly since GNP in these countries itself are
so low.
To operationalize the importance of investment, human resource
development, and exports into neoclassical economic growth theory,
we have chosen to use a variation of a model used by Ram (1987).
Ram's model expands on the simple production function model by
including exports as an "input" (equation 1).
an

additional

input

to

a production

The idea of exports as

function

model

has

been

developed by researchers such as Chenery (1979), Krueger (1980),
and Feder (1983).

The output equation is given by:

Y=f(L,K,X)

(1)

where Y is aggregate real output, L and K are labor and capital inputs
respectively, and exports are represented by X.
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Taking the growth

rate of these variables, we obtain the growth rate of output as a
function of the growth rate of the explanatory variables.

We choose

a linear functional form of the growth rate equation for estimation
purposes.

The estimated equation is given in (2):

(2)

Y = Bo + Bl L + Bid -i- Bx X +u

where the dot over the variables indicates growth rates for the
variables, I is the growth rate of investment,
term.

u is a stochastic error

The signs of all of the coefficients estimated in equation (2)

should be positive since they are inputs.
The neoclassical model of economic growth may be a necessary
but not sufficient condition to achieve economic growth.
assumes the existance

This model

of an institutional framework that allows

production and exchange to take place.

Though the role of economic

institutions is not disputed, they are often overlooked due to the
belief that they are naturally available.

Therefore, many economist

do not emphasize economic institutions when discussing economic
growth.

Reynolds (1983) on the other hand, re-emphasized this

connection between economic growth and economic institutions in
explaining why some country's economic performance is better than
others, given differences in factor endowments.

He has mentioned

that those countries which have had better economic performance
have

also

been

shown to

have

especially political institutions.
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the more

effective

institutions,

He thus suggests their inclusion as

some of the determining factors of economic growth.

Reynolds

argues that political instability is perhaps the most important factor
that explains the differences in economic growth across nations and
through time.

Sub-Saharan Africa, like many LDCs, have limited

economic and political institutions both in numbers and effectiveness
compared with DCs.
often

The economic institutions that they do have are

still at an early

developmental

stage,

and therefore

their

fragility makes them susceptible to changes in the economic, social,
and political environment.

This fragility is most evident in Sub-

Saharan Africa, where independence was only recent.

Because of the

short time that has past since independence, along with the high
degree of political instability, institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa's are
extremely fragile.
The basis for our study's inclusion of a political instability
variable as a determinant to economic growth lies in an institutional
approach to economic growth.

An institutional approach looks at an

economic system as a set of institutions.
made up
institutions

of economic,
are

social,

responsible

An economic system is

and political institutions.

for

the

acquisition,

These

accum ulation,

distribution, and implementation of the factors of production as well
as

output.

Therefore,

an

economic

system,

hence

economic

performance, of a country is dependent on its institutions.

The

institutional approach to economic growth differs from that of the
neoclassical approach by not only stressing the importance of the
stocks and flows of the factors of production, but the economic agents
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and institutions which guide, manage, and direct these factors (Fei
and Paauw).
Econom ic

in stitu tio n s

w ithin

the

econom ic

system

are

institutions dealing with economic activities in the areas of finance,
labor, trade, and agriculture.

Social institutions in the system are

responsible for passing on knowledge and skills from one economic
agent to another.

Political institutions in an economic system provide

such things as law and order which allows economic exchange to take
place by providing norms of economic behavior.

Political institutions

also allow for the distribution of resources and the unity economic
agents need for the success of national economic goals.
institutions

are

also

involved

protection of other institutions.

in

the

creation,

Political

m aintance,

and

As Reynolds has suggested, where

such institutions do not exist, their absence could

impede economic

grow th.
Given the role of political institutions in an economic system, a
shock, such as political instability, to a polititcal institution(s) would
likely affect other institutions in the system.

Political instability may

or may not cause the collaspe of a political intitution(s), but in any
circumstance, it will create uncertainty about the institution(s) in the
short-run.

Due to the influence of political institutions on other

institutions in the economic system, the uncertainty would likely
spread to these other institutions.
have

the

effect

of

creating

Therefore, political instability will
uncertainty

institutions, but within all the institutions
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not

only

in political

that

form an economic

system.

This

uncertainty

in the

other institutions

w ithin

the

economic

system would likely have an effect on the economic

performance of a country
The short-term effect of uncertainty of a political institution on
economic growth is likely to be negative.

Uncertainty will cause the

risk associated with any economic activity to increase.

An increase

in risk will disrupt the institutions responsible for the acquisition,
accumulation, and distribution of the factors of production.

Economic

institutions such as those dealing with finance, agriculture, and labor
would likely be negatively affected.

Political instability may cause

panic in the banking industry due to the uncertainty of savings
accounts.

The borrowing of funds from banks may also decrease.

Investors would likely reduce their investments in a country were
the stability of political institutions were uncertain.

Risk may also

cause agricultural institutions to cut back on extending credit to
farmers, thus reducing

output.

The possible effect

of political

instability on labor institution may be the reduction in the labor
force itself or the productivity of labor.
may

be

affected

if

Labor force participations

w orkers feel that

their

safety

may

be

compromised due to violent political instability, they may refuse to
leave the safety of their homes.
Political

instability

would not

only

affect

the

acquisition,

accumulation, and distribution of the factors of production, but how
these factors are used by economic agents.

It is our belief that

political instability causes the inefficient usage of the factors of
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production by disrupting the motivation of capitalists and workers
alike.
Fei and Paauw have stated that for economic growth to occur
nationalism must be present.

Nationalism is a cohesive bond that

unites people based on national interests.
and political concensus.

It is associated with unity

Nationalism is essential to economic growth

in the sense that it allows for economic goals to be defined at a
national level and it coordinates economic agents in reaching these
goals.
interest.

It subsumes factional and regional interests to a national
The unity associated with nationalism is also essential in

getting economic agents to work together.
Given that nationalism may be needed to bring economic agents
together to work for the success of common economic goals, anything
that causes

a breakdown in this cohesiveness

or results

in the

uncertainty as to the continuation of this cohesiveness would affect
the success in reaching economic goals.

Since political instability

involves conflict among groups or individuals, its existence is proof
that not all groups or individuals are unified.
unified, different goals may emerge.

If the populace is not

These goals may contradict one

another resulting in poor economic performance.

Also, this conflict

among economic agents may cause them to become at odds with one
another.

As a result, economic decisions may become based on

emotions rather than on concerns for efficiently reaching common
goals.

Even if only a small percentage of economic agents are

experiencing conflict with one another, it may leave doubt in the
3 1

minds

of other economic

country.

agents

about the

cohesiveness

of the

If these economic agents feel that there is not enough unity

to carry out

national economic goals, apathy may set in.

Therefore,

they may lack interest in using resources efficiently

since they

believe that goals will not be met anyway.
Due to the short-term effect that political instability has on the
roles of economic institutions and economic agents, hence economic
growth, we feel that a political instability variable should be included
in our model of economic growth.

To investigate this aspect, we add

to the production function model (equation 2), a political instability
variable to get equation 3 (model A):

/ = Bo + Bl L, t Bit + Bx X - Bpi PI + u

(3 )

where the PI variable is the measure of political instability and all
other variables remain the same as defined above (equation 2).

The

sign of the political instability coefficient should be negative.
As we have mentioned above, it is likely that the occurrence of
political instability would affect investment.

Investors would see

uncertainty that is created by political instability as an added risk.
Since investors are risk adverse, the growth of investments would
decline.

Therefore, the investment variable in equation (3) would be

endogenous.

If indeed this variable is endogenous and we use

equation (3) to estimate the effects of the independent variables on
economic

growth,

the

investment
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coefficient

would

be

biased.

Therefore, we propose that a simultaneous equation model be used
here (model B).

Along with equation (3), there should be another

equation to explain investment.

Not only would this equation keep

estimates from being biased, the equation will also allow us to
measure the indirect effect of political instability through investment
on economic growth. The investment equation is given as:

I = Bo + Bv"V" - Bp i PI +u

where

all variables,

except

"V"

are

(4)

defined

above.

The

"V"

represents a set of variables which are determinants of investment.
The set of "V" variables consist of DeltaQ, Deltaid, and DeltaM. DeltaQ
is the change in output, Deltaid and DeltaM are the changes in foreign
aid and imports.

DeltaQ is to represent what entrepreneurs were

expecting demand to be when determining how much investment
was needed to produce this level of output.

The Deltaid variable

is

thought to be a source of additional investment funds from external
aid to allow for investment.

Since investment often involves the use

of imported capital, changes in imports should reflect changes in
investment.

The signs of our Delta variable's coefficients in equation

(4) should be positive.
We will test the political instability variable's stability in model
A by dropping out each of the input variables one at a time.

If the

political instability variable's coefficient keeps the same sign the
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coefficient of political instability can be concluded that it i
and hence is not dependent on the specification of the model.
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stable

DATA
The

data used

for this

study

was

compiled

by

the

corporation and printed in the working draft of D EFEN SE

Rand
AND

DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE DATABASE AND
C O D E B O O K . The data is for 41 Sub-Saharan African states from 1970
to 1983.
The political instability variable is made up of different conflict
events that have occurred in Sub-Saharan African countries between
the period from

1970 to

1983.

The categories of conflict are

assassinations, guerrilla warfare, major government crises, purges,
riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations.
A s s a s s in a tio n

are

politically

m otivated

m urder

or

attem pted

murders of high ranking government officials.
G uerrilla

W arfare is any armed activity carried out by independent

bands or irregular forces aimed at the overthrow of the present
regim e.
Major

Government Crises are any rapidly developing situation that

threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime that is not
through constitutional means (excluding revolts).
P urges are the elimination of political opposition members by jailing
or execution.
R io ts

are any violent demonstration of more than

involving the use of physical force.
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100 citizens

Revolutions

include any illegal or forced changes in the top

government elite, successful or unsuccessful.
A n ti-G o v ern m en t

D em o n stratio n s

includes any peaceful public

gathering of at least 100 people to oppose government policies or
authority.
We have assigned values to these conflict events to represent
their degree of disruption, with the highest value being the more
severe.

The value of 5 was given to revolution.

given to guerrilla warfare.
assassinations and

A value of 3 was

major government crises.

A value of 4 was
assigned to both

The value of 2 was

given to both riots and purges, and a value of 1 given to
government

anti

dem onstrations.

The growth of output variable is measured as the growth rate of
real gross domestic product.

The growth rate of labor variable is

measured as the growth rate of population.

Due to an insufficient

data on labor characteristics in Sub-Saharan Africa, we were forced
to use population as a proxy variable.
The growth rate of investment variable is measured as the real
growth

rate

investm ent

of
is

gross dom estic

m easured

as

the

investm ent.

Gross

outlays

the

for

dom estic

addition

of

reproducable capital goods to the fixed assets of private and public
enterprises, private nonprofit organizations, the general government,
and the value of net increases and decreases in inventories.

This

includes all domestically produced items and those produced abroad.
Government outlays for construction and durable goods for military
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purposes were excluded.

This variable was used to exclude those

expenditures on durable military goods because of their lack of
production capabilities.
The growth rate of exports variable is measured as the real
growth rate of exports.

Exports are measured as the goods and

services included in the general exports of merchandise plus exports
of sevices

and purchases from

abroad.

Transfers of gifts

personal effects between households are also included.
valued f.o.b.

and

Exports are

Imports are defined the same as exports except they

are valued c.i.f.
Aid is the total official development assistance, ODA, provided by
OECD/D AC members, multilateral agencies, and OPEC countries.
All variables

defined are measured in real terms using the

implicit GDP deflator.
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DATA
VARIABLE
Y
X
L
I
PI
DELTAQ
DELTAID

OBSERVATIONS
467
464
420
452
550
467
464
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MEAN
3.330
5.833
2.834
7.887
2.885
3626.5
365.9

STD. DEVTATTON
8 .9 3 7 5 2
2 8 .2 7 2 0
1.02772
76 .2 5 0 7
5 .9 1 0 3 4
20 9 5 2 .5
3253.38

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The statistical techniques we will be using for our analysis is
Ordinary

Least-Squares

and Two

Stage Least-Squares

regression.

Regression analysis is the study of the dependence of one dependent
variable on the one or more explanatory variables, with the view of
estimating

the population mean of the dependent variable given the

known values of the
Ordinary Least

explanatory variables.
Squares

(OLS)

regression

will

be used

for

estimating the single equation models since it is the best linear
unbiased estimator (BLUE) with minimum variance.
The method of Two Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) regression was
chosen for its ability of estimating simultaneous equations.
process of 2SLS was developed by Henri Theil.
squares is

The

Two stage least-

used when equations contain an endogenous variable as

an explanatory variable.

Endogenous only means the the variable is

not predetermined in the model, or in other words it has its own set
of explanatory variables. If the endogenous variable is used as a
explanatory variable, it will result in the disturbance term

being

correlated

hence

with the endogenous

explanatory

variable, and

results in biased estimates.
A durbin-watson statistic for the model showed that there were
no problems with auto-correlation.
collinearity

among

the

We also checked for multi-

independent
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variables

using

Pearson

correlation coefficients.

Here again, we found no evidence that the

independent variables are highly correlated with one another.
We

did

run

into

a problem

with the

specification of

the

The second equations used to predict

the

simultaneous

model.

growth rate

of investment with the independent variables DeltaQ,

Deltaid, DeltaM, and PI resulted in coefficients which were not as
expected given the theory, which in turn caused coefficients in
equation (3) to be biased.
equation (3)

We assume that this problem was due to

of the model not being specified to account for

variation in investment across countries.

the

To solve this problem we

had to model for cross-national and time-series data.

We did this by

using a Least Squared Dummy variable model for equation (3) which
uses country dummy variables.
in

investm ent

among

the

This technique allows for differences
countries

intercepts for these countries.

by

allow ing

for

different

We could not use all of the country

dummies because some were linear combinations.

After dropping

out some of the dummies, the specification problem was solved.

RESULTS
The regression results for model A are presented in Table 2.
Using an F statistic to test the coefficients of the model together to
determine if the coefficients are statistically significant from zero, we
see that the F-value of 28.87 allows us to reject the hypothesis that
all coefficients are

equal to zero.

The set of independent variables in

model A accounted for an adjusted R-square of .2159.

In other

words, 21.59 percent of the variation in the model was account for
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by the set of independent variables.

Considering that our sample is

of a cross-sectional nature along with the fact our coefficients all
reulted in expected signs, we feel that the model is a "good fit".
The estimated coefficients for model A are also presented in
Table 2.

Here we see that the estimated coefficient for the growth

rate of exports is .10818.

This translates into an increase of .10818

percentage points in growth of GDP with each percentage point
increase in the growth rate of exports.
growth of population is .439725.

The estimated coefficient for

The growth rate of investment

resulted in a .037709 percentage point increase in the growth rate of
GDP with each percentage point increase.

The coefficient for the

political instability variable shows that a negative ralationship exist
between political instability and the growth rate of GDP.
we

see that the coefficient for political instability

Specifically,
is -.196958.

Therefore, with each increase in political instability point the growth
of rate of GDP would decline by .196959 percentage points.
A t-test for the significance of individual coefficients shows that
the

growth

of

exports

and

investm ent

are

both

statistically

significant from zero at the 5% level.

The growth of population

variable was not statistically significant.

The coefficient for political

instability did prove to be significant from zero.

The t-value of 3.274

for the political instability coefficient is statistically significant at any
reasonable level of significance.
The signs of the coefficients for the single equation (3) model
were as expected.

The "input" variable's coefficients were possitve,
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and the sign of the political instability coefficient was negative.
Therefore, this supports our belief that political instability has a
negative effect on economic growth.
The results of the simultaneaous equation model can also be
found in Table 2.

Model B used simultaneous equations due to our

belief that the growth of investment was endogenous.

The second

equation of model B regressed the dependent variable, growth of
investment, on the independent variables change in aid, change in
output,

change in imports,

political instability,

variables for the different countries.
the change in aid is -.001242.

and the

dummy

The estimated coefficient for

The coefficients reported for the

change in output and imports are .000228 and .000261 respectively.
The coefficient for the political instability variable is -1.058758.
From these results, we see that the effect of political instability is to
reduce the growth of investment by 1.058758 percentage points for
each one point increase in the political instability value.

According to

these results investors are highly sensitive to political instability.
A test for individual significance shows that only the change in
aid and political instability variables are statistically significant at a
5 percent level of significance.
Using the predicted values from our growth rate of investment
equation, we estimated the growth rate of GDP equation (3).
statistic

of

25.28

coefficients are

allows

us

to

reject

the

hypothesis

equal to zero when tested together.

41

An F
that

all

The adjusted R-

square for the model is .1942.

Thus, the total variation explained by

the independent variables in the model is 19.42 percent.
The coefficient for the growth rate of exports in this model is
very similar to the one reported for in model A.

The coefficient for

exports reported here is .108707.

The growth rate of population

coefficient for

substantially

model B dropped

to

only

.307167.

According to the estimated coefficient of growth rate of investment,
each percentage point increase in investment resulted in a .14239
percentage point increase in the growth rate of GDP.

The coefficient

for political instability in model B is much lower than the one
reported in model A.

In model B, the coefficient for political

instability is -.091382.

Therefore, according to this coefficient, the

direct effect of a one point increase in political instability would be to
reduce the growth of GDP by .091382 percentage points.

When

testing for individual significance we see some changes from our
results in model A.

Like model A, growth of the population is

insignificant and both the growth of exports and investment are
statistically significant at a 5 percent level of significance.

In model

A the political instability coefficient was statistically significant at
any reasonable level.

In model B, we see that the political instability

coefficient is no longer significant at even a 10 percent level, though
it does just miss being significant at a 10 percent level of a one tail
test.
In the growth rate of investment equation (4), we see that the
variables

political

instability,
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change

in

output,

and

change

in

imports have the expected signs.

Only the negative sign for the

change in aid coefficeint was a surprise.
was given to invest in projects.
mean

more

investm ent.

A

We had thought that aid

Therefore, increases in aid would
possible

reason

why

a

negative

relationship exist between changes in aid and the growth rate of
investment may be that aid is used to offset poor investment years.
Therefore, increases in aid may be associated with years of poor
investment growth and where the aid is not enough to fully offset
poor investment growth.
The signs in the growth rate of GDP equation were all as
expected.

The "input" variables all showed to be positive influences

on the growth rate of GDP.

We were also not disappointed in the sign

of the political instability sign.

The model confirmed our contention

that political instability has a negative effect on the growth rate of
GDP.
To measure the total effect of political instability on the growth
rate of GDP, we have to take into account both the indirect and direct
effects

instability.

The indirect effect is measure by political

instability's effect on investment (equation 4) and the effects of
investment on economic growth.

Since investment is a determinant

to economic growth, any effect on it would therefore affect economic
growth.

The direct effect is measured by the political instability

coefficient in the growth rate of GDP equation (3).
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The total effect of

political instability is measured by the following equation:

dY
dPI

=

+ JL.

, «EI
PI
I

PI

where the first setof partial derivatives account

for the

indirect

effect, and the last partial derivative measures the direct effect.
Calculating the indirect effect, we see that political instability
reduces the growth rate
percentage

points

of GDP through investment by

w ith

each

additional

one point

.15076

increase.

Combining this indirect effect with the direct effect the total effect on
the growth of GDP by an increase in the political instability variable
is .24214 percentage points.

The total effect of political instability on

economic growth, when measured with the

single equation

model,

shows that a decrease of .19696 percentage points in the growth rate
of GDP with each one point increase in political instability.

From this,

we see that the single equation model underestimates the total effect
of

political

in stab ility

by

simultaneous model.
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18.7

percent

com pared

with

the

TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR
MODEL A AND MODEL B
Coefficients:
Model

A

X

Intercept
1.96412

(t-value)

.10818

PI

I

.0377

-.19696

(4.6)

(-3.274)

(8.559) (1.283)

(1.859)

Adj. R square

.43972

L

.2159

Simultaneous
eo u a t ion
model B:
(Equation

3)

(t-value)

-.09138
(1.118)

Adj. R square
Coefficients:
(Equation
(t-value)

4)

1.4105 .10871

.30716

.14239

(7.224)

(5.887)

(-1.218)

(.752)

.1942
DeltQ

De l t ai d

DeltaM

.000228

-.00124

.000261

(1.565)

(-1.754) (1.153)

PI
-1.0587
(-2.509)

R square
.0987
NOTE: with the no intercept option the R-square definition
is changed to: l-(resid u al sum of squares/uncorrected total
sum of squares).
* represents all the dummy variables used for the different
countries.
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STABILITY TEST
AND COMPARISONS
We tested

the

stability

of the

coefficients

of the

political

instability variable by dropping a single variable among the "input"
variables in model A.

The results were that in each case the the sign

of the political instability coefficient remained negative (see Table 3).
Only the absolute magnitude of the coefficient changed.
significant
dropped

change

from

the

occurred

when

model.

The

the

investment

political

increased by 19 percent when this happened.

The most

variable

instability

was

coefficeint

This is not surprising

since we have indicated that political instability may affect the
growth rate of investment, as well as directly affecting economic
growth.
Theoretically, we have stated that political instability is likely to
affect both the accumulation, distribution, and the usage of the
factors of productions.

To measure these effects, we added a political

instability variable to a neoclassical growth model.

Since political

instability may affect investment, we added another equation to the
model to measure this effect.

This leaves us with deciding which

model is best, the single equation model or simultaneous equation
m odel.
The

results

we

obtained

in

the

second

equation

of

the

simultaneous model have strenghted the case for using such a model.
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CONCLUSION
The data used for this study was a combination a

cross-national

and time-series for 41 Sub-Saharan African states from
1983.

1970 to

The purpose of this study was to determine if political

instability had a negative short-term effect on economic growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
instability causes

As stated before, we believe that political

a disruption in the ability

of institutions

economic agents to perform their economic functions.

and

Thus political

instability disrupts the accumulation, distribution, and usage of the
factors of production, and hence economic growth.

To measure this

disruptive force of political instability, we developed two models.
The first model was a simple production function model with the
addition of an export and political instability variable.
was estimated using OLS techniques.
simultaneous equation model.

This model

The second model was a

Along with the growth equation, we

added a second equation to measure the indirect effect of political
instability on economic growth through investment.
this

equations

stems

from

the

The reason for

thought that political

induces uncertainty which investors translate into risk.

instability
Therefore,

any added risk will cause investors to cut back on investments.
Our regression results for both models have shown that indeed
there is a negative relationship between political instability
economic growth.

and

We feel, however, that the use of the simultaneous

eqation model, where political instability’s effect is measured both
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directly and indirectly, is the proper model to use.

According to our

simultaneous equation model's coefficients, the total effect of political
instability

is

to

reduce

the

economic

growth

rate

by

.24214

percentage points with each one point increase in its value.

This

would imply that a coup, which has a value of 5, would decrease the
economic growth rate by 1.2107 percentage points.

Using a single

equation OLS model, we find that a point increase in political
instability results in a .19696 decrease in the economic growth rate.
It can be seen that political instability can severely

affect the

economic growth of an African state regardless of whether we use a
simultaneous equation model or a single equation OLS model.
A comparison of our results with the results of others is almost
impossible due to the diffferent approaches taken on the subject.
The common approach to the relationship between economic growth
and political instability is to treat economic growth as determining
political

instability.

The researchers

who have taken

such

an

approach have almost unanimously found that economic growth does
inhibit political instability.
The one study that we found that takes the same approach to
the subject as we do, found no short-term statistical significant effect
on economic growth.
short cummings though.

This study by Londregan and Poole had some
We did not agree with their specification of

their model or their measurement of a short-term effect.

Therefore,

a direct comparison of their results with ours would not benefit
either study.
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We should state that even though we found political instability
to have a statistically significant negative effect on economic growth,
this does not contradict the findings of other researchers who found
that economic growth has a negative effect on political instability.
Both theories of causation can exist simultaneously.

All our findings

show is that whatever causes political instability, political instability
has

a negative effect on economic growth.

If poor economic

performance causes political instability, it will in turn cause poorer
economic performance.
There are a wide range of factors that have attributed to Africa's
poor economic performance, such as climate, diseases, and outside
constraints on economic trade.
there

Besides these uncontrollable factors

are also internal or controllable

pointed to by researchers.

Besides the disruption from political

instability, other controllable factors
and

heavy

government

factors which have been

involvem ent

such as forced industrialization
in

the

markets

pointed to as responsible in part to slow development.

have

been

It would be

irresponsible to suggest that by reducing internal political conflict in
Africa the economic performance problems would be solved, but not
to recognize the adverse effects of political instability would be
equally irresponsible.
instability

In this sense, we only suggest that political

in Sub-Saharan Africa be considered as a barrier to

economic development.

Therefore, any policy action to stimulate

economic growth would have to address the problem of internal
conflict along with any other problems Sub-Saharan Africa faces.
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This

paper,

at

least,

focuses

on

the

relationship between political instability

need

to

the

and economic growth in

LDCs generally, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.
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investigate

NOTES
1) These are a sample of coups which appeared in McGowan and Johnson's
1988 article
Q uantitative

2)

Historical

Analysis"

Data is from "World Development Report 1989"

O xfo rd

3)

"African Military Coups d'etat and Underdevelopment; a

University

A few

Press,

The World Bank,

1989.

notes to clarify the

meaning

of uncertainty.

Uncertainty

always com m on sin ce people are unable to see into the fu tu re .
we

refer

to

uncertainty.

uncertainty

being

in

addition

to

the

But here,

normal

level

of

Where the probability given to the occurance of an event is

severely affected.
political

as

is

Another idea relating to the spread of uncertainty from

institutions

should be clearified.

to

other

institutions

w ithin

the

econom ic

system

One would likely point to political instability in the

DCs to show that little if any uncertainty had spread to other institutions.
The above scenerio for political

instability was

countries.

that this

infancy

We only suggest

of their

more developed,

institutions.
thus

The

stronger,

most severe instances of political

4)

happens

institutions

enabling

not meant to be for all

them

in

in the

LDCs due to the
DCs

have

to w ithstand

all

become
but the

instability.

We should note here that conflict is common to all countries, but in

most nations conflict does not grow to the point of being classified as
political

instability.

The

reason
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why

conflict

in

LDCs

may

have

a

tendency to develop into political instability may be due to the lack of
institutions to resolve such conflict.

5)

The list of countries which were included in this sample were:
ANGOLA

MADAGASCAR

BENIN

MALAW I

BOTSWANA

MALI

BURKINA FASO

M AURITANIA

BURUNDI

M A U R ITIU S

CAMEROON

MOZAMBIQUE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NIGER

CHAD

NIGERIA

CONGO

RWANDA

D JIB O U TI

SENEGAL

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

GABON

SUDAN

GAMBIA

SW AZILAND

GHANA

TANZANIA

GUINEA

TOGO

G UINEA -B ISSA U

UGANDA

IVORY COAST

ZAIRE

KENYA

ZAM BIA

LESOTHO

ZIM B A B W E

LIB E R IA

6)

The countries that had to be dropped from the model were:
ANGOLA

GUINEA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

G U IN EA -B IS SA U

CHAD

M ALI
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DJIBOUTI

MOZAMBIQUE

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SOMALIA

GAMBIA
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